CEPII, Recherche et Expertise sur l'economie mondiale
Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US


Antoine Bouët
Leysa Maty Sall
Yu Zheng

 Points clés :
  • A trade war initiated by a Trump administration in 2025, according to the main proposal from the president campaign, is costly for world GDP (-0.5% in 2030) and world trade (-3.4% in 2030).
  • The US and China are the most affected countries, with GDP losses of 1.3% for both countries. The US has also seen an increase of consumption price index.
  • Simulation with the MIRAGE-Power model shows a major reallocation of trade flows, with a collapse in trade between China and the United States, and a significant widening of the trade deficits of many countries vis-à-vis China.
  • The application of trade retaliation measures by US partner countries implies greater GDP losses for the US. Nevertheless, the retaliation is not, in terms of impact on GDP, positive for all the US partner countries.

 Résumé :
Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.


 Mots-clés : US Trade Policy | Tariff | Trade Retaliation | Computable General Equilibrium Models

 JEL : F13, F14
CEPII Working Paper
N°2025-03, February 2025

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