Hubert Kempf will present " Talking heads. Public communication policies in an international economy " (co-authored with Olga Kuznetsova).

The authors study a non-cooperative communication game being played by national policymakers in a two-country economy including a beauty-contest argument in the utility functions of agents and cross-border real spillovers. Each policymaker receives signals on the real idiosyncratic shocks which affect the country economies. She has the choice of revealing or not the received signals. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game being played by policymakers always entails revelation, either full or partial. When the equilibrium is characterized by full transparency, it is Pareto-optimal. From a normative point of view, no revelation may be Pareto-optimal: the social value of public informations non-cooperatively provided by policymakers may be negative in international economies. Partial revelation schemes are possible outcomes but never Pareto-optimal.

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